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Cyberweapons: an emerging global governance
architecture
Tim Stevens1
ABSTRACT Cyberweapons are a relatively new addition to the toolbox of contemporary
conﬂict but have the potential to destabilize international relations. Since Stuxnet (a malicious
computer worm) in 2010 demonstrated how computer code could be weaponised to gen-
erate political effect, cyberweapons have increasingly been discussed in terms of potential
regulation and prohibition. Most analyses focus on how global institutions and regimes might
be developed to regulate the development and use of cyberweapons and identify the political
and technical obstacles to fulﬁlling this ambition. This focus on centralized authority obscures
identiﬁcation of existing governance efforts in this ﬁeld, which together constitute an
emerging global governance architecture for offensive cyber capabilities. This article explores
three sources of cyberweapons governance—cyberwarfare, cybercrime and export controls
on dual-use technologies—and brieﬂy describes their political dynamics and prospects.
It is argued that although fragmented, the global governance of cyberweapons should not be
dismissed on this basis. Fragmentation is a condition of global governance, not its antithesis,
and policy should respect this fragmentation instead of regarding it as an impediment to
further development of cyberweapons governance. This article is published as part of a
collection on global governance.
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Introduction
Cyberweapons have been covert military and intelligencetools since the 1990s but it was only in 2010 that thestrategic potential of weaponised code was put under the
global spotlight. The disclosure by technical experts and journal-
ists of a cyberweapon dubbed “Stuxnet” showed how computer
code could be weaponised to generate political effect. Reportedly
the product of a highly-classiﬁed US-Israeli intelligence pro-
gramme, Stuxnet inﬁltrated the control systems of an Iranian
nuclear facility to subvert its uranium enrichment operations
(Sanger, 2012: 188–225; Zetter, 2014). It succeeded in doing so
and, although its impact on the Iranian nuclear programme is
probably overstated (Barzashka, 2013), it demonstrated that
cyberweapons could be deployed as political weapons in pursuit
of national interests. Stuxnet has also reopened older debates
about how, and if, the acquisition and use of cyberweapons
should be regulated or even prohibited, through institutions like
“cyber arms control” regimes and conventions. This work
suggests that obstacles to building such institutions are signiﬁcant
and possibly counter-productive and perhaps should not be
attempted in the ﬁrst place. The continued focus on centralized
mechanisms has prevented a clear assessment of extant or
emerging measures regulating the acquisition and use of
cyberweapons in peace and war. This commentary proposes that
global governance is a more appropriate lens through which to
view these processes and that a nascent global governance
architecture for cyberweapons already exists.
The argument proceeds as follows. The ﬁrst section deﬁnes and
describes what is meant by “cyberweapon”, a term often used
loosely and without analytical rigour. This is followed by a brief
review of previous arguments relating to the regulation of
cyberweapons and why “global governance” is a more useful
perspective than a focus on regimes alone. Cyberwarfare,
cybercrime and export controls on dual-use technologies are
then explored to show how global governance in the absence of
centralized authority is emerging, albeit slowly and in disjointed
fashion. The ﬁnal section analyses this governance architecture,
concluding that, whilst fragmented, this should be seen as a
condition of cyberweapons governance, not as an excuse for
failure or inaction.
Cyberweapons
“Cyberweapon” has become a catch-all term for diverse forms of
malicious software (malware) for which an extraordinary range of
capabilities is claimed. Cyberweapons are conceived on a
spectrum from low-level internet irritants, to war-winning “cyber
bombs”, even to the equivalents of “weapons of mass destruc-
tion”. The reality is rather less dramatic and the term—if it is to
be used at all (Valeriano et al., 2016)—has been deﬁned as
“computer code that is used, or designed to be used, with the aim
of threatening or causing physical, functional, or mental harm to
structures, systems, or living beings” (Rid and McBurney, 2012;
Rid, 2013: 37). This is broadly analogous to established notions of
a weapon as “an offensive capability that is applied, or that is
intended or designed to be applied, to an adversary to cause
death, injury or damage” (Boothby, 2016: 166). However, these
are not juridical or legal terms, as there is no consensus deﬁnition
of either weapons or cyberweapons in international law. For our
purposes, it is sufﬁcient that a weapon meets the criteria of
intentionality and harm, although cyberweapons present at least
two additional challenges to deﬁnition and conceptualization.
The ﬁrst is that most cyberweapons lack conventional
physicality: they are computer code that exists only in informa-
tion infrastructures like the internet. They are “in the world but
not experienced as part of the world” (Floridi, 2014: 318), until
such time as their effects manifest in more conventional ways.
The existence, operations and effects of cyberweapons and other
“information objects” are wholly contingent on physical pro-
cesses, entities and events (Dipert, 2014: 36–37), but cyberwea-
pons are not themselves physical in any natively comprehensible
fashion. This is signiﬁcant, not only as this makes them difﬁcult
to track and interdict, but because most jurisdictions and legal
regimes understand weapons to be material, rather than
immaterial, entities (Mele, 2013: 9). The exception to this is
when modiﬁed hardware is used as a cyberweapon, or when
hardware is speciﬁcally designed to be part of a cyber weapons
system (Schmitt, 2013: 142), both of which should be considered
alongside cyberweapons qua informational objects.
The second is the nature of harm. Moral arguments as to the
nature of harm—most notably in the liberal tradition (Linklater,
2006)—do not consider harm to non-humans, so the extension of
the concept of harm to “structures, systems, or living beings”
(Rid, 2013: 37) is philosophically problematic (also, Arimatsu,
2012: 97). “Harm” in this context must include the related
concepts of “damage” or “impairment”, which do apply to non-
humans and non-sentient systems. In a slightly metaphorical
register, therefore, this expansive category of harm covers
outcomes injurious to the well-being of a target system, or which
set back the interests of that system. For example, malware that
extracts data but does not use it to degrade or subvert a computer
system would not be considered a cyberweapon (Rid, 2013: 47).
However, as establishing the nature and degree of harm is a
notoriously subjective process, it is difﬁcult to develop precise
thresholds for what constitutes harm or otherwise, not least as the
type and severity of harm depends on the nature of the target.
Notwithstanding the issue of whether non-cognising entities can
experience harm, this points to the relational nature of harm.
Cyber weapons are not equipped with “an explosive charge”, so
harm is caused by altering processes of the targeted system, rather
than as a direct result of some innate attribute of weaponised code
(Rid, 2013: 41). This applies to the logical functioning of a
targeted computer system, which is affected directly by a cyber
weapon, and to the second-order effects of cyber weaponry, such
as ﬁnancial loss or reputational damage to a company subject
caused by a cyber attack. It should also include the affective
implications of the use of cyber weapons (Stevens, 2016a: 103–
104) if they result in harm, perceived or actual, to human
subjects. These might include feelings of insecurity or fear caused
by infrastructure failure, or the more mundane but no less real
emotions that result from personal data loss. In both cases, these
are usually indirect weapons effects (Rid, 2013: 40), although,
contra Rid, this does not necessarily alter the original code’s
intended status as a weapon.
One further comment is necessary on the identiﬁcation of
software as a weapon. As the above discussion afﬁrms, weapons
are not technical artefacts alone but hybrid assemblages of human
and non-human entities (Bourne, 2012). The appeals to harm and
intent reﬂect this concern with human agency as the principal
determinant of “weapon-ness” throughout the various stages of
planning, design, development and deployment, as well as in
mechanisms of commercial and criminal exchange. Nevertheless,
the construction of malware as weapons may on occasion hinder
rather than help understanding of these complex entities. This
operates, ﬁrst, by conﬂating disparate tools and instruments
within a single rubric and, second, by masking the heterogeneity
of their anatomies and deployments within a ﬁeld of militarized
discursivity. As we will encounter below in the discussion of dual-
use technologies, many “cyberweapons” have defensive rather
than offensive purposes, and, far from being intended to cause
harm, can be used for socially beneﬁcial reasons. In that instance,
malware would cease to be a weapon per se, but this does
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demonstrate the inherently fuzzy boundaries between which
instance of software constitutes a weapon and which does not.
“Cyberweapon” is retained here, both because it is tightly if
imperfectly deﬁned herein, but also because it provides an
opportunity to engage with the substantial literature that already
uses the term. It is hoped that future work can develop a more
productive and nuanced terminology.
Cyberweapons and global governance
Stuxnet was widely perceived as a “game-changer” in interna-
tional affairs (Farwell and Rohozinski, 2011, 2012; Collins and
McCombie, 2012) by demonstrating the political potential of
cyberweapons, which, like all weapons, aim to change the
behaviour of an adversary. The reputed subsequent online
publication of portions of the Stuxnet code sparked fears of
proliferation to non-state actors including terrorists, and the
possibility of an inter-state cyber “arms race” (Singer and
Friedman, 2014: 158–159; Craig and Valeriano, 2016; Limnéll,
2016). Stuxnet also reinvigorated a long-running discussion about
if cyberweapons should be regulated and which parties might be
capable of doing so. Early authors on the topic pointed out that
non-state use of cyberweapons might be subject to criminal law,
and state use by international humanitarian law, but that any
regime would be of limited use without signiﬁcant international
commitments to monitoring, veriﬁcation, compliance and
enforcement (Denning, 2000, 2001; Sofaer and Goodman,
2000). States would also be resistant to cyber arms control
measures if they restricted their capacity to respond to aggression,
by states or non-state actors, although they might help promote
norms around offensive cyberweapons use (Eriksson, 1999;
Rathmell, 2003).
Subsequent analyses have tended to default to one of two
frames in discussing the regulation of cyberweapons. The ﬁrst is
arms control, in which historical experiences with nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons serve as resources for thinking
through how arms control mechanisms might be applied to
cyberweapons (Brown, 2006; Geers, 2010; Meyer, 2011; Arimatsu,
2012; Maybaum and Tölle, 2016). The second frame concerns the
criminalization of cyberweapons (Denning, 2000, 2001;
Prunckun, 2008), drawing on the evolution of the Council of
Europe Convention on Cybercrime (2001), discussed in greater
detail below. In both frames, there is a presumption towards
globally binding legal mechanisms administered by a central,
hierarchical authority and supported by leading powers, the
absence of either portending the likely failure of attempts to
regulate or prohibit cyberweapons. What is missing from this
literature is an attempt to look at cyberweapons governance “in
the round”, understood as a concern with what currently exists,
rather than what might be future optimal solutions (Stevens,
2016b). Speciﬁcally, the cyberweapons literature, in its concern
with legal and institutional regimes, does not address the
importance of global governance frameworks for understanding
international politics.
Emerging at the end of the Cold War and cognisant of the
growing potency of globalization, “global governance” repre-
sented an interdisciplinary concern with international order in a
post-bipolar world (Zumbansen, 2012: 84). In International
Relations (IR), this translated into understanding order as having
foundations other than traditional political-legal authority,
including the roles of transnational and non-state actors, and in
ﬁnding positive solutions to transnational problems (Hofferberth,
2015: 601). As Coen and Pegram (2015) observe, recent IR global
governance scholarship has moved beyond a narrow focus on
multilateral institutions and great powers to incorporate the
agency of diverse actors and constituencies. One analytical
framework emerging from this work is that of “global governance
architectures”.
A “global governance architecture” is “the overarching system
of public and private institutions, principles, norms, regulations,
decision-making procedures and organizations that are valid or
active in a given issue area of world politics” (Biermann et al.,
2009). This framework is narrower in scope than “order”, which
speaks to the organization of international relations in general,
but broader than “regime”, which tends towards a focus on
institutions (Biermann et al., 2009: 15–16). Global governance
architectures consist of vertically fragmented arrangements of
multilevel governance (subnational, national, international,
supranational) and horizontally fragmented multipolar govern-
ance structures of state and non-state actors (Biermann and
Pattberg, 2012: 13). The making and implementation of rules is
located at multiple points in this matrix, although interlinkages
between the various layers and poles of authority and practice are
necessary to translate rules and policies from one locus to
another. The potential utility of this analytical framework to
global cyberweapons governance is currently unexplored. As a
ﬁrst step, the following section identiﬁes existing attempts to
regulate cyberweapons in the ﬁelds of cyberwarfare, cybercrime,
and export controls on dual-use technologies. Each ﬁeld of
activity attempts to regulate a different aspect of cyberweapons
acquisition or use. Cyberwarfare is concerned with the use of
cyberweapons in war; cybercrime with the acquisition and use of
information technologies that can be used in the prosecution of
crime by non-state actors; export controls aim to prevent transfer
and proliferation of dual-use technologies that can be used to
develop or facilitate cyber weapons use by state and non-state
actors.
Sources of cyberweapons governance
Cyberwarfare is subject to signiﬁcant attention presently and one
key task is to ascertain how it articulates with international
humanitarian law (jus in bello). The most comprehensive attempt
thus far is the Tallinn Manual Process (TMP), based at the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) in
Estonia. The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable
to Cyber Warfare (Tallinn Manual), an exhaustive analysis by
international lawyers, ﬁnds that customary international law
applies to cyberwarfare, as with other forms of military force
(Schmitt, 2013). The Tallinn Manual addresses cyberweapons
within this framework, suggesting that they are prohibited from
causing “unnecessary suffering” to combatants if military
objectives are not furthered by their use (Schmitt, 2013: 143).
Non-combatants are already protected in law and should not be
subject to cyberweapons use. The TMP has no binding legal
status but NATO formally incorporated its recommendations
into its Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy (NATO 2014: article 72).
The United Kingdom has conﬁrmed these principles in defence
strategy (Ministry of Defence, 2013), as has the United States (US
Department of Defense, 2015a). US military doctrine for
cyberwarfare also respects opinio juris on the matter, although
submits that “[p]recisely how the law of war applies to cyber
operations is not well-settled” (US Department of Defense, 2015b:
996), a situation the second volume of the Tallinn Manual will
address in late 2016 (NATO CCD COE, 2015).
Russia asserts that the TMP serves the bellicose interests of “the
West”, whereas Russia prefers “a diametrically opposed policy of
averting military and political confrontations in information
space” (Krutskikh and Streltsov, 2014: 75). Both propositions are
rejected by one TMP expert, who surmises that Russia criticizes
the TMP because it “run[s] counter to their objective of modelling
international law in a manner that serves the interests of the
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Russian Federation” (von Heinegg, 2015: 2). Neither the Russian
claim nor the NATO rebuttal is unjustiﬁed: law is as much about
facilitation as it is about prohibition. When law is translated into
military doctrine, doctrine is an enabler of military operations. It
constrains actions in important ways but provides opportunities
in others. The TMP and any corresponding processes seek to
preserve and maximize military freedom of movement in pursuit
of political goals, congruent with particular interpretations of
international law and prevailing norms. It follows that the
legitimacy and modes of cyberweapons deployment in war
depend on how divergent national and coalition interests are
translated into laws, norms and, perhaps, future treaties.
The debate about cyberweapons and cyberwarfare rests on the
interpretation of existing international law and its applicability to
a novel weapons class. In contrast, discussions about global
cybercrime have, for the last 15 years, been with principal
reference to an entirely new instrument, the Council of Europe
Convention on Cybercrime (“Budapest Convention”, 2001). The
Convention aims to harmonize national cybercrime legislation,
enhance transnational policing measures in pursuing and
prosecuting cybercriminals, and improve international cyber-
crime cooperation (Vatis, 2010; Jakobi, 2013: 108–112). The
Convention has been signed and ratiﬁed by several non-European
states, including Canada, Japan, Australia and the United States,
and remains open for accession by others. Brazil and India have
refused to sign the Convention, as neither played a role in the
drafting of the treaty, and Russia claims that transnational
policing and investigation violate its sovereignty. China and
Russia have suggested that the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion is their preferred forum for cybercrime cooperation (Lewis,
2010). Notwithstanding these objections, and issues surrounding
its effective implementation (Calderoni, 2010), the Convention is
widely regarded as the pre-eminent framework for the prohibi-
tion of cybercriminal activities.
The Convention makes no mention of cyberweapons but
Article 4.1 requires state parties to criminalize intentional actions
in and through computer systems that result in the “damaging,
deletion, deterioration, alteration or suppression of computer
data without right”. Furthermore, state parties may require that
such actions “result in serious harm” (Article 4.2). These two
articles alone would criminalize the deliberate use of code to
cause harm, although the Convention does not further specify to
which entities harm must be caused. Article 11 criminalises
“aiding and abetting” such activities. There is therefore a range of
instances meeting the criteria of intent and harm outlined earlier
and the Convention may have further utility in disrupting
cyberweapons supply chains. State use of cyberweapons is
presumably excepted, although their roles in cyberweapon
components markets is legally a grey area and deserves closer
attention (Jakobi, 2015; Herzog and Schmid, 2016; Wolf and
Fresco, 2016).
The newest source of cyberweapons governance also relies on
existing mechanisms, speciﬁcally the Wassenaar Arrangement on
Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods
and Technologies (1996). In December 2013, the Arrangement
was extended to classes of hardware and software “specially
designed or modiﬁed for the generation, operation or delivery of,
or communication with ‘intrusion software’”, deﬁned as software
intended to extract or modify data from a computer system or
networked device, or which would “allow the execution of
externally provided instructions” (Wassenaar Arrangement,
2016). This was the ﬁrst attempt to incorporate hardware and
software associated with cyberweapons into a multilateral regime,
although it did not extend to intrusion software itself, into which
various cyberweapons components fall. At the end of 2014, EU
member-states incorporated the new rules into domestic
legislation (Tung, 2014). The United States expressed similar
enthusiasm but public consultation revealed signiﬁcant opposi-
tion and in March 2016 the State Department admitted the
amendment required renegotiation before translation into
domestic law (Barth, 2016). The principal objection was that it
would criminalize security researchers using malware systems to
improve security products, a potential side-effect recognized since
cyberweapons regulation was ﬁrst discussed (for example,
Denning, 2000, 2001). Although “well-intentioned”, the amend-
ment would therefore have a negative effect on cybersecurity
(Hoffman, 2016).
This indicates clearly the dual-use nature of malware, which
can be used for “defensive” and research purposes, as well as
“offensive” deployments as cyberweapons proper. In this context,
intent determines if malware attains the status of a weapon, not
technical considerations (cf. Forge, 2010). It is unclear if the
revised Wassenaar Arrangement can be renegotiated to protect
legitimate malware uses. Its future efﬁcacy depends on incentivis-
ing legitimate security research whilst controlling the export of
illegitimate weapons components (Herr, 2016). This task is
greatly complicated by Wassenaar’s weak enforcement mechan-
isms, the interplay of state interests, and the technical difﬁculties
in monitoring the transfer of code across the internet (Pyetranker,
2015; Herr, 2016). It does, however, count Russia and the United
States as participants, along with 39 other states, which indicates
the strength of normative commitments to export controls on
dual-use technologies generally.
An emerging global governance architecture
The three ﬁelds discussed above—cyberwarfare, cybercrime,
export controls—together constitute an emerging global govern-
ance architecture for cyberweapons. Each attempts to regulate
different aspects of cyberweapons acquisition and use, if not
always explicitly in those terms. None is well-advanced
institutionally, or in efﬁcacy, as states are still developing
cyberweapons and non-state actors still seek to acquire them.
Whereas some authors suggest an outright ban on cyberweapons
is both possible and desirable (for example, Saran, 2016), the
proper frame for considering cyberweapons is regulation, not
prohibition. Similarly, whilst ambitions for an overarching treaty
framework on cyberweapons are laudable, they founder on well-
known obstacles. As Slack (2016: 72) observes of cybersecurity,
“the fundamental conception of cyberspace, the lack of a common
terminology, the issue of veriﬁcation, and the dual-use, asym-
metric, fast-paced and nonstate-centric nature of the domain …
ultimately render a treaty approach unfeasible”. Normative
approaches are preferred that identify speciﬁc issues requiring
action, through which “a governance network may emerge where
norms of behaviour are developed across a range of fora” (Slack,
2016: 75). One such issue area would be cyberweapons,
cooperation over which may be required to settle on “good
enough governance” (Grindle, 2004, 2007), rather than aim to
close all governance deﬁcits.
This is important because there are signiﬁcant differences of
opinion in all three ﬁelds examined here, none of which will be
resolved easily but which should not prevent progress being
made. Cyberwarfare consensus founders on interpretations of
international humanitarian law, particularly as inﬂuential opinio
juris emanates from NATO, to which Russia and China are
unsurprisingly resistant. They object similarly to “European”
cybercrime initiatives for reasons of sovereignty, which effectively
puts two of the world’s most important actors outside of the only
international convention attempting to regulate cybercrime. The
United States objects to the amended Wassenaar Arrangement on
the grounds that it undermines security, not that it is seeking to
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limit its freedom of action, although that dynamic cannot be
discounted. The dispute between “the West” and Russia and
China, in particular, portends a return to geopolitics in
cyberweapons governance, debates over which express deeper
concerns about the nature of security in information environ-
ments. As rehearsed many times, there is a difference of opinion
at the ideological level between broadly liberal nations that
prioritize a global, open internet and more authoritarian regimes
that seek to regulate the internet along national lines, although
liberal states are not exempt from accusations of naked self-
interest (Mueller, 2010; DeNardis, 2014; Carr, 2015; Powers and
Jablonski, 2015). On the credit side of the ledger, however, there
is signiﬁcantly more cooperation within these ﬁelds at present
than there has ever been.
Conclusion
This commentary has introduced the concept of cyberweapons
governance but is under no illusions that such a discrete policy
ﬁeld currently exists in any formal sense. It does not. It is merely a
suggestion that more attention to this issue is required,
particularly as practice evolves rapidly and secondary analyses
proliferate. As a ﬁrst step, it has described where cooperation and
conﬂict exist between institutions, norms and major actors, and
some of the reasons why. It would also be productive to consider
the precise institutional and processual paths by which each of
these architectural components has come to exist, as such
historical considerations are beyond the scope of this article. The
evidence base at present favours analyses of state and inter-
governmental initiatives but more research is also required into
the actions of civil society, industry and other non-state actors.
This would reﬂect scholarly work on global cybersecurity and
internet governance more broadly, which overlaps with some of
the concerns raised in this article in both theory and practice
(Mueller, 2010; DeNardis, 2014; Nye, 2014; Saran, 2016.
One ﬁnal suggestion is that fragmentation is inherent to global
governance architectures and should not be considered an a
priori impediment to global cyberweapons governance. This is in
contrast to most work on cyberweapons, which presents
fragmentation as the antithesis of progress. Instead, fragmenta-
tion should be viewed as inevitable and, to a certain extent, as an
opportunity. Efforts should be directed towards reducing conﬂicts
over norms and institutions, rather than convergent norms and
hierarchical institutions being viewed as prerequisites for effective
governance.
Cyberweapons governance is a problematic proposition, on
account of environmental complexity; monitoring, veriﬁcation,
compliance and enforcement; and, power politics. The diversity
of actors and institutions is also a major challenge but may be its
strength. Regulatory innovation emerges not through hierarchies
but through diversity. The plethora of public-private partner-
ships, bilateral agreements, memoranda of understanding,
industry initiatives, conﬁdence-building measures and civil
society activism, in the broad ﬁeld of cyber security may
encourage the development of novel technical, political and
organizational proposals contributing to workable and effective
cyberweapons governance. Cyberweapons governance is a
daunting prospect but one that needs to be addressed as an
emerging security issue. In this respect, fragmentation should be
regarded as a condition of progress and as a reaction to the
“fuzziness” of the object of governance itself, not as a sign of
failure or an excuse for inaction. It took many years to develop
effective frameworks for regulating and prohibiting other
weapons classes (Mazanec, 2015). None is perfect but each serves
the public good better than its absence. So too with cyberwea-
pons. Their full capabilities have yet to be demonstrated but
cyberweapons may in future cause substantial harm and damage,
maybe even to human life itself. A global governance architecture
for cyberweapons is developing quietly and haltingly. It is
fragmented and contested but perhaps more constructive than
none at all.
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